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1 INTRODUCTION 
Marine activities in the Arctic have long traditions. 
The first ships entering arctic areas were just for 
exploration purposes, but from the early 17th century 
to present time, various whale-catching, fishing and 
seal catch-based activities evolved in the area. The 
first whale-catching station was established in 
Smeerenburg on Spitzbergen in 1614.  
The marine activities often had to deal with major 
safety challenges, like encountering sea ice, getting 
frozen into the ice, remoteness, darkness, poor 
visibility, long distances, etc. However, one of the 
major safety challenges these ships had to deal with, 
and still have to deal with is ship icing (Dyrcz, 2019). 
This phenomenon occurs in temperatures below 
subfreezing of seawater where sea spray may, in 
combination with snow and different atmospheric 
conditions, freeze on the ship's hull and 
superstructures, followed by both reduced ship 
stability and lowering freeboard. During the last 45 
years, there has been a motivation for different 
maritime research to develop better forecasting 
models for accretion of sea spray icing. Several 
researchers (Kachurin et al., 1974; Stallabrass, 1980; 
Overland et al., 1986; Makkonen, 1987; Horjen, 1990; 
Henry, 1995; Lozowski et al., 2000), all base their 
calculations on spray flux ice accumulation rate (RW) 
in kg/m²s, by solving the heat flux equation (Eq. 1) for 
a freezing surface. The heat fluxes on the right side of 
the equation contribute to freezing when positive and 
melting when negative, thus contribute to the heat 
release due to freezing flux of water (Qf), i.e. ice 
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accumulation, as given on the left side of Eq. 1, 
(Samuelsen et al., 2015).  
Qf = Qc +Qe + Qd (1) 
where 
Qf - Heat flux released by freezing (W/m²) 
Qc - Convective heat flux (W/m²) 
Qe - Evaporative heat flux (W/m²) 
Qd – Heat flux from incoming water droplets (W/m²) 
According to e.g. Samuelsen et al. (2015), this 
equation has limitations by just taking into account 
few important heat flux aspects. The importance of 
implementing relevant and realistic knowledge and 
understanding about ship icing accumulation aspects 
in MET is essential for executing proper seamanship 
in the Arctic. More advanced heat flux equations will 
be discussed in this paper. 
Problems concerning ship icing related to reducing 
ship stability and lowering freeboard are largely 
considered for smaller ships like ordinary fishing 
vessels, crab fishing and seal catcher ships from 
approximately 10m to 50m length, but there are 
several examples of ships larger than that, which have 
been exposed to reduction of stability due to ice 
accretion. One specific example is the Norwegian 
coastguard vessel, KV Nordkapp, which went into 
serious icing conditions between Bjørnøya (Bear 
Island) and Hopen in February 26-27, 1987, followed 
by an estimated accumulation of approximately 110 
tons of ice in just 17 hours.  
This case shows that ice could accumulate rapidly 
if conditions for icing are present, like sailing into a 
Polar low. Figure 1 shows pictures of icing of the 
superstructure of KV Nordkapp (Samuelsen et al., 
2015). 
 
Figure 1. Icing on Coast Guard vessel KV Nordkapp on 27 
February 1987, Barents Sea (Photo by Prof. S. Løset). 
A Polar low is defined as: “Small-scale, intense, 
short-lived atmospheric low-pressure system 
(depression) found over the ocean areas poleward of 
the main polar front in the northern and southern 
hemispheres. Polar lows can be difficult to detect 
using conventional weather reports and are a hazard 
to high-latitude operations”, (PWOM, 2019).  
An estimation of the stability aspects and an 
assessment of observed and estimated ice rate of this 
specific example of a Polar low related ship icing 
event will be given later in this paper.  
Additional ship icing aspects related to Polar lows, 
individually or in combination with ordinary sea 
spray ship icing, will also be highlighted.  
The consequences of Polar lows could be a 
severely increased probability of ship icing by: heavy 
snow, strong wind gusts, thunderstorms, radically 
dropping temperatures, rising waves, waterspouts, 
unpredictable conditions etc.  
The goal of this paper is to set focus on better and 
more adequate understanding of state-of-the-art 
research of different meteorological aspects of ice 
accretion on ships, and also set focus on to what 
degree STCW (IMO STCW, 2011) can be used as 
guidelines for MET schools, with respect to ship 
stability related to marine icing. 
Use of “state-of-the-art” theory in MET schools is 
one of the prerequisites for executing proper 
seamanship. Overland et al. (1986) define “potential 
icing rate” as: “a sustained icing rate by a vessel that 
is not actively avoiding icing through heading 
downwind, moving at slow speeds, or avoiding open 
seas”. 
Note, however, that this paper will not focus on 
the underlying causes of how polar lows occur, and 
in-depth explanations of how ship icing forecasting 
accumulation algorithms and heat flux equations are 
structured.  
The analytical part of the study is approached by 
an evaluation of “state-of-the-art” theory about 
forecasting and accumulation models for ice 
accretion, then by a discussion of Polar lows influence 
on ship icing, followed by a case study of how KV 
Nordkapp was influenced by a Polar low on 27 
February 1987. In addition, a document study of the 
icing related content of STCW (IMO, 2011) and the 
Polar Code (IMO, 2015) is given. 
2 BACKGROUND 
Over the last decades sea ice retreats in Arctic have 
led to opening of new operation areas for increasing 
maritime activities like cod fishing, shrimp trawling, 
crab catching, seal hunting, energy harvesting and 
tourist related activities, etc. This sea ice retreat has 
also opened for new areas of occurrence of Polar lows 
due to increasingly open seas along the southern ice 
edge of the Arctic Ocean, including the Barents Sea, 
the Bering Sea and the Beaufort Sea (Kolstad and 
Bracegirdle, 2008). Figure 2 shows the first Polar low 
satellite image in open sea north of Svalbard. 
MET schools offering sea officer education and 
certification related to the Polar Code must strive to 
use “state-of-the-art” theory regarding Polar lows, 
related to where they can occur and the impact these 
lows have on ship icing. In addition, there are new 
research-based theories referred to forecasting of 
accumulation on ship icing that should be included in 
MET. The importance of having proper relevant 
understanding of these aspects forms the basis for 
preventing accidents related to human elements. 
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Figure 2. NOAA satellite image, Svalbard 11.26 UTC, 8. 
January 2010. Image: NOAA/met.no 
According to EMSA‘s analysis of 1170 ship 
accident events, 60.5 percent were directly attributed 
to erroneous human actions (EMSA, 2016). Other 
research shows that 75-96 percent of maritime 
accidents are directly or indirectly caused by some 
form of human error (Hanzu-Pazara et al., 2008). 
However, human elements represent a significant 
contribution in all ship accidents.  
MET schools must therefore strive to provide the 
students with the best possible basis for exercising 
their practice. In-depth understanding and 
knowledge of any subject is a prerequisite for 
exercising well-executed actions. (Johansen and 
Batalden, 2018). 
Ship icing has caused many accidents and near 
accidents in polar waters. Raise of the centre of 
gravity by ship ice accumulated above deck level of 
vessels has led to reduction of stability followed by 
severe scenarios like, capsizing, submerging, and the 
loss of lives (Shellard, 1974). 
Examples of recent documented incidents 
associated with reduction of stability and buoyancy 
are the following: January 26, 2007, the 75-feet fishing 
vessel Lady of Grace sank in Nantucket Sound at the 
east coast of the USA (United States Coast Guard 
2008), and January 3, 1999 at the coast of Northern 
Norway another ship sank, costing the lives of 4 and 3 
persons, respectively. The latter incident is revealed 
by investigating the database of ship accidents from 
the Norwegian Maritime Authority (2014). 
Another concrete recent accident arose on 11 
February 2017 offshore Alaska. A crab-fishing vessel 
with a crew of six suddenly vanished north of St. 
George Island in the Bering Sea. From the reports of 
other vessels, it is believed that icing may have been 
the cause of this accident that led to capsizing, 
submerging, and the disappearance of the vessel (The 
Seattle Times, 2017). 
From the book “Alaska Shipwrecks 1750-2015” by 
Captain W. Good and M. Burwell (2018), some 
relevant icing related accidents are described, like:  
− The 58-foot fishing vessel Hunter capsized and 
sank January 2007 in the Shelikof Strait, location: 
South Central Alaska 57º 26 ̍’ N 156º 01’ W. High 
winds and freezing sea spray caused heavy icing 
followed by instability and starboard list. The ship 
sank in ten minutes. (Good and Burwell, 2018, p. 
213). 
− The 80-foot steel crab-fishing vessel Rosie G took 
on water from the stern and sank January 30, 1997 
northwest of Cape Cheerful, location Southwest 
Alaska 53º 52 ̍’N 166º 32 ̍’W. The Rosie G developed 
severe ship icing in -40°C followed by a 45° 
starboard aft list causing serious water ingress. 
The Rosie G sank by the stern because of severe 
ship icing (Good and Burwell, 2018, p. 460).  
− The 96-foot Lin-J capsized in heavy icing 
conditions northwest of Saint Paul Island March 
18, 1999. There is no further information of the 
accident, probably because the entire crew was lost 
(Good and Burwell, 2018, p. 717). 
All these accidents are located in Polar waters, but 
there are examples of severe ship icing further south 
e.g. on 14 February 1979, North Sea, and west of 
Thorsminde, Denmark, 6 fishing vessels sank due to 
ship icing, followed by reduction of stability and 
buoyancy. The weather conditions for these cases 
were, eastern breeze, strength 8-10 Beaufort, and the 
temperature approx. - 8 ° C i.e. perfect conditions for 
ship icing (sbib.dk, 1979). 15 fishermen were lost on 
that day. 
The accidents presented are just some few 
documented examples related to ship icing, which 
shows there may be a potential in strengthen the 
understanding of this phenomena. In addition, there 
are near accidents like the KV Nordkapp case, where 
ships have experienced reduction of stability, without 
serious consequences. For these cases, accumulated 
sea ice lead to a rise of the vertical centre of gravity 
and thus reduced metacentric height (GM) followed 
by reduced GZ levers.  
3 MARINE ICING MODEL 
In the physical models for wave-ship-interaction icing 
the source of water is expressed in terms of a spray 
flux (Rw). This flux provides an upper boundary on 
the amount of ice that is accumulated per unit time. In 
order to derive the rate of ice accretion (Ri) at a certain 
position of the ship, a surface energy balance is 
assumed between the heat released from the freezing 
flux of water (Qf) and the most important heat fluxes 
from the atmosphere, ocean, and underlying surface 
(Samuelsen, 2018).  
A general full set of heat fluxes per unit area of 
spray flux ice accumulation (RW) in kg/m²s acting on 
a plate area is written as (Eq. 2).  
Qf = - Qv – Qk + Qc +Qe + Qd + Qr +Qs +Qcond (2) 
where 
Qf - Latent heat released during freezing (W/m²) 
Qv - Viscous/frictional/aerodynamic heating from the 
air (W/m²) (Makkonen, 1984)  
Qk - Kinetic energy of spray converted to heat in the 
interaction process (W/m²) (Lozowski et al., 1983) 
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Qc - Convective or sensible heat flux from the air 
(W/m²) (Makkonen, 1987, 2010) 
Qe - Evaporative or latent heat flux from the air 
(W/m²) (Makkonen, 1987, 2010) 
Qr - Heating or cooling from radiation (W/m²) 
(Horjen, 1990), (Lozowski et al. 2000) 
Qd - Heating or cooling from the spray (W/m²) 
(Henry, 1995)  
Qs - Heating or cooling from snow (W/m²) (Horjen, 
1990) 
Qcond -The conductive heat flux through the ice (W/m²) 
(Kulyakhtin et al., 2016) 
An explanatory illustration of how ice accretion is 
set in context with the heat flux balance is shown in 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic illustration of the relationship between 
sea spray icing and heat flux balance (Dehghani-Sanij et al., 
2017) 
Different researchers take into consideration 
different combinations of these heat fluxes in their ice 
rate prediction models. According to Samuelsen 
(2018), the Modified Stallabrass, Overland and the 
Marine-icing model developed for the Norwegian 
Coast Guard (MINCOG) represent the only physically 
based spray flux icing models applied in operational 
weather forecasting. The Overland icing rate 
predictor model (Eq.3) is based on the heat flux 
equation (Eq. 4) and ends up in a schematic icing class 
rate, table 1 (Samuelsen, 2018). 
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Pr = Icing predictor (m/s °C) 
V  = Wind speed (m/s) 
Tf = Freezing point of sea water (°C) 
Ta = Air temperature (°C) 
SST = Sea Surface Temperature (°C) 
Φ  = 0.3 °C-1 (Overland, 1990), and 0.4 ºC-1 
(Overland et al. 1986) 
      f c dQ Q Q= +  (4) 
Table 1. Icing class and rate based on (Overland, 1990) _______________________________________________ 
PR   <0   0 -22.4 22.4 -53.3 53.3-83.0  >83.0 _______________________________________________ 
Icing   None Light  Moderate Heavy  Extreme 
Class 




This model is applied as basis for operational 
weather forecasting (Ekeberg, 2010). A comparison of 
the applied physically spray flux icing models shows 
a gap between the Overland and the other models 
This comparison will be presented later in the paper, 
(see Figure 9).  
4 POLAR LOW CHALLENGES 
Ordinary weather is predictable in that both low- and 
high-pressure systems and different atmospheric 
conditions can easily be detected by satellite images. 
This predictability makes it possible for meteorology 
authorities to predict weather conditions with 
sufficient accuracy, but this is not applicable for 
predicting Polar lows. These lows are unpredictable 
i.e. when and where they occur, what direction they 
take, strength, duration and atmospheric conditions 
(Nordeng & Rasmussen 1992). As Polar lows affect 
the stability of ships, those who sail ships into Polar 
low areas must have competence and knowledge of 
these aspects. Figure 4 shows a satellite image of the 
Polar low that hit KV Nordkapp at February 27, 1987. 
Polar lows like the one in Figure 4 will raise to 
strong northerly winds in combination with heavy 
snowfall, west of the epicentre. According to 
Samuelsen (2017), this snowfall may lead to an 
additional negative effect on ship stability.  
 
Figure 4. Satellite image of the Polar low over the Barents 
Sea on 27 February 1987. Image imported from the French 
Wikipedia. 
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5 THE KV NORDKAPP CASE 
The KV Nordkapp case was chosen because of icing 
caused by the ship sailing into a Polar low, Figure 4, 
and because of a documented comparison between 
observed ice rate and icing rates calculated by 
different icing rate models as presented by Samuelsen 
et al. (2015). See Figure 9 in the discussion. 
 
Figure 5. Synoptic situation at 26 and 27 February 1987, and 
the position of KV Nordkapp (red cross) during the trip 
when Met-ocean observations were taken. The time of the 
observation is in UTC/Z (Universal time center/Zulu time). 
The green line is an approximate position of the ice edge at 
26th February (Initial time 1987-02-26 06Z). The red dots 
mark the approximate position of the Polar low according to 
satellite image information from 0428z, 0853z, 1243z and 
1702z, Samuelsen et al (2015). 
Figure 5 shows KV Nordkapp’s positions during 
the voyage, influenced by the weather conditions 
west of the Polar low epicentre. The air temperature 
from 06z to 21z was between -12°C to - 20°C. There 
was wind from north-west between 20 - 30 m/s 
followed by maximum wave height 7.5m and sea 
surface temperature (SST) between +3 to -4°C; thus, 
conditions for ship icing were optimal (Samuelsen et 
al., 2015).  
Samuelsen et al. (2015) present a comparison 
between Overland, Stallabrass and own test models 
against observed ice accumulation rate for this 
specific case, and this will be highlighted in the 
discussion. 
5.1 Coast Guard vessel KV Nordkapp’s characteristics 
The main particulars of the Coast Guard vessel KV 
Nordkapp are reported in Table 3, and the ship 
profile is shown in Figure 6. 
Table 3. KV Nordkapp`s main particulars _______________________________________________ 
Length over all         105.05 m 
Length between perpendiculars   97.50 m 
Beam            14.60 m 
Depth            7.50 m 
Lightweight (∆_ls)        2785.4 ton 
Max operating(∆max)       3579 ton 
Min operating (∆min)       3239 ton _______________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 6. KV Nordkapp’s profile from the GA plan. 
5.2 KV Nordkapp’s stability reduction 
The calculation of the stability reduction of KV 
Nordkapp due to icing is based on an estimated 
weight of 110 ton accumulated ice, Samuelsen et al 
(2015), at a vertical position above the baseline 
(VCGice = 11.557m), as shown in Figure 7. VCGice is 
the average vertical centre of gravity for accumulated 
ice, as reported by the stability manual of the ship.  
The stability manual was originally developed 
when the ship was built in 1982, but it was 
redeveloped in 2017 according to the same criteria 
that can presently be found in the IMO requirements 
regarding intact and damage stability (IMO, 2008). 
Based on information by the Norwegian Navy, KV 
Nordkapp was stated with loading condition code 2, 
fully loaded, at departure 26 February 1986. This 
condition is equivalent to “max operating condition” 
(∆max). According to the KV Nordkapp stability 
booklet, this condition corresponded with the data 
reported in Table 2 and visualized in Figure 7.  
Table 2. KV Norkapp`s loading condition 2 particulars _______________________________________________ 
Displacement (∆0)       3579 ton 
Mean draught (T0)       5.120 m 
KG0 (incl. FSC)        6.395 m 
KM0            7.532 m 
G0M0 (incl. FSC)       1.137 m 
KGmax           6.691 m _______________________________________________ 
KGmax (Table 2) corresponds to the maximum KG 
according to both intact and damage stability 
requirements. 
 
Figure 7. KV Nordkapp from the GA plan of the ship, 
showing the center of gravity of accumulated ice (VCGice), 
initial vertical center of gravity (KG0), initial depth (T0), 
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initial metacentre (KM0) and initial meta-center height 
(G0M0).  
Departure displacement, including the 110-ton 
accreted ice, became 3689 ton. According to the 
stability booklet, this increased displacement was 
followed by a corresponding mean draught Tice 
5.273m, KMice 7.464 m and KGmax-ice 6.687m. Based 
on the following equation (Eq. 5), the center of gravity 




KG M VCGKG 6.594
M
m= ∆× +∑ × =
∆ +
 (5) 
KGice ended below KGmax-ice, thus within the 
stability booklet requirements by (6.687 – 6.549) m = 
0.138 m. However, considering also the variation from 
KM0 to KMice, the ice accretion led to a variation of 
metacentric height (GM) from 1.137 m to (7.464 – 
6.549) m = 0.915m, i.e. a reduction of 1.137 – 0.915 = 
0.222 m. The corresponding reduction of the KV 
Nordkapp stability is visualized by the GZ curve, 
Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8. KV Nordkapp`s GZ curve based on departure and 
ice accreted conditions, February 26 and 27 1986. 
6 MINCOG METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned in the introduction, several different 
researchers have tried, for decades, to develop 
predictions of sea spray ship icing.  
Samuelsen (2017) presents a review of the most 
central research done in this area, as well as a 
presentation of a new model, the Marine Icing model 
for the Norwegian Coast Guard (MINCOG). This 
model is developed on the basis of different data sets 
derived from observation of 37 ship icing events 
obtained from the Norwegian Coast Guard. In his 
thesis, Samuelsen presents the uniqueness of this 
model by a high level of accuracy compared to 
currently applied methods.  
One of the findings in Samuelsen’s research is the 
importance of not relating wave information with 
wind parameters in the model because there could be 
strong winds close to the ice edge, but short fetch 
lengths for waves to develop (Samuelsen, 2017). 
Regarding waves, in his research he also found that 
the nature dictates an upper limit of ship icing from 
interaction between wave and ship, because high 
waves rarely coexist with very low temperatures 
(Samuelsen, 2017). The amount of sea spray related 
icing also depends on ship type (bow height and 
shape), and wave characteristics. 
Samuelsen (2017) also highlights that inclusion of 
snow may be an important contribution for ship icing 
to accumulate, and that this contribution ensues most 
frequently during cold air outbreaks from the ice and 
in areas influenced by Polar lows.  
The MINCOG heat flux equation (Eq. 6) does not 
take into consideration the heat fluxes flux 
components - Qv – Qk +Qs +Qcond (see Eq.2). The 
reason for this is partly to simplify the equation, but 
also that the data set showed that the neglected heat 
fluxes had little impact compared to empirical results.  
Qf = Qc +Qe + Qd +Qr (6) 
The effect of snow, Qs, is neglected because of 
uncertainties related to amount of water accumulation 
by the snow (Samuelsen and Naseri, 2018). Other 
research shows that wet snow has low density and 
weak adhesion during forming. Therefore, wet snow 
may have limited impact on icing. However, Table 4 
shows that the adhesion is strong when the snow is 
frozen. 
Table 4. Typical properties of accreted atmospheric ice 
(Fikke et al., 2006) _______________________________________________ 
Type  Density  Adhesion & General Appearance 
of ice  (kg/m³)  Cohesion  Colour  Shape _______________________________________________ 
Glaze 900   strong  transparent evenly  
                distributed/ 
                icicles  
Wet  300-600  Weak  white   evenly 
snow      (forming)       distributed/ 
       Strong        eccentric 
       (frozen)   
Hard  600-900  strong  opaque   eccentric, 
rime               pointing  
                windward  
Soft   200-600  Low to  white   eccentric, 
rime      medium      pointing 
                windward _______________________________________________ 
7 THE STCW’S AND POLAR CODE’S 
REQUIREMENTS TO COMPETENCE 
The STCW Standard of competence (IMO, 2011) 
represents the compulsory minimum requirements 
for the acquisition of a certificate as an on-duty deck 
officer on ships with a gross tonnage of 500 or more. 
Until the Polar Code (IMO, 2015) had its entry into 
force in 2017, the requirements of competence 
regarding ship icing was supposed to exclusively be 
given by the International Convention on Standards 
of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for 
Seafarers, 1978 (IMO STCW, 2011). Tables A/II-1 and 
A-II/2 in the STCW convention, describe minimum 
standards of competence for master and officers 
operating a ship. The only STCW requirement related 
to ice was a general knowledge about sea ice 
conditions when planning a voyage i.e. no 
requirements related to ship icing.  
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When the Polar Code entered into force, the 
content was added into the governing STCW 
Convention followed by additional minimum 
requirements for training and qualifications of 
masters and deck officers operating in polar waters, 
as given in chapter V/section A-V/4. The additional 
Polar Code related competence requirements became 
divided into basic training for all officers on-board 
and an additional advanced training for master and 
chief mates. The convention then stated that 
candidates for basic as well as advanced training 
should have knowledge and understanding of the 
implications of spray-icing, danger of icing up, 
precautions to avoid icing up and options during 
icing up (IMO, 2011). 
There are some aspects regarding these 
requirements that are challenging for the acquisition 
of competence with respect to Ship icing: 
1 The Polar Code is only mandatory for ships 
operating in polar waters and the definition of 
“Polar waters” is more a political definition than a 
meteorological definition and therefore icing 
events are also likely to occur outside the area of 
polar waters.  
2 The Polar Code is implemented into the STCW 
convention, but this code is only applicable to 
ships larger than 24 meters in length. This means 
the major part of fishing vessels is not regulated 
under the Polar Code, thus, the Polar Code 
requirements with regard to icing do not have 
implications for the training requirements for crew 
on-board these vessels.  
8 DISCUSSION 
This paper shows there are still a lot of challenges 
regarding knowledge and understanding both with 
respect to the amount of and the consequences of ship 
icing. To give ship officer students’ relevant 
understanding of proper prediction of ice accretion, 
presupposes that the MET schools base their learning 
on “state-of-the-art” theory, both for the matter of 
design and operation. 
Samuelsen et al. (2015) comparison between real 
icing rate using the Overland, Stallabrass and own 
icing rate models show some gaps. According to 
Figure 9, one can notice that Overland`s estimated 
icing rates (blue lines) shows large differences with 
respect to the real icing rate (pink line). It is, thus, 
questionable that the Overland`s model is applied as 
both basis for operational weather forecasts and as 
theory for MET. The T1 model by Samuelsen (2018) 
and the ModStall model M3 by Stallabrass (1980) 
correlate well with the real icing rate.  
 
Figure 9. Observed icing rate (pink color) and icing rates 
from nine different algorithms related to the KV Nordkapp 
case. Three Overland algorithms (O1, O2, O3) in blue 
colour, three ModStall algorithms (M1, M2, M3) in green 
colour and three Test model algorithms (T1, T2, T3) in black 
colour (Samuelsen et al., 2015). 
This outcome is an important reminder for 
weather forecasters, STCW and for MET schools in 
developing requirements and curriculum for ship 
officers’ education. Samuelsen and Naseri (2018) have 
also revealed other limitations of the Overland model 
e.g. limited correlation between wind strength and 
wave height; the upper limit of ship icing caused by 
high waves rarely coexists with very low 
temperatures and conditions related to Polar lows. 
One challenge regarding the data collection that 
forms the basis for the MINCOG model is that the 
data sets are only collected from one type of vessels. 
Droplets from sea spray that form ship icing will 
more likely hit the superstructure and upper part of 
smaller vessels as a consequence of bow height and 
shape. Because of this aspect, the MINCOG and other 
ice rating models should be tested and verified for 
several types and sizes of ships.  
With reference to Figure 9, the limitation of the 
Overland prediction icing rate model results in 
inaccurate estimates. Bearing in mind the variability 
in accuracy among the presented prediction icing rate 
models is important for both weather forecasts and 
MET. Using the correct model for icing rate prediction 
is a prerequisite for issuing an accurate and realistic 
decision supportive ship icing forecasts.  
The occurrence of Polar lows in new areas of polar 
waters is challenging and demands that ship officers 
be aware of this aspect with reference to Figure 2. 
The estimated stability reduction in the KV 
Nordkapp case was within the maximum required 
vertical center of gravity (KGmax), regulated by the 
stability manual. If the ship had continued to sail 
without action to remove ice, the KGice had exceeded 
the requirement of the stability manual.  
However, an ice accretion of 110 ton, like in the KV 
Nordkapp case, could easily be actual for smaller 
ships followed by more severe consequences.  
In addition, IMO and other authorities also have 
developed and implemented the ice accretion 
allowance regulations discussed by Mintu et al. 
(2016), see Table 5. 
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Table 5. Ice Accretion Allowance regulations discussed by 
Mintu et al. (2016) _______________________________________________ 
IMO Regulations IMO Polar Code (2015) 
       IMO Intact Stability Code (2015)  
Classification   ABS (2015) 
Society     RMRS Rules (2016) 
Rules     DNVGL (2015) 
       Lloyd`s Register (2015)  
Offshore     ISO 19906 for Arctic Offshore Structures  
Structures     (2010) 
Codes     NORSOK (2007) 
       Canadian Std. CSA S471 (2004) _______________________________________________ 
 
For references mentioned in Table 5, see Mintu et 
al. (2016). 
Ship stability is affected by accretion of sea spray 
icing, atmospheric icing and snow (freezing to ice). 
Norsok N-003 (Standards Norway, 2017) discusses 
the accumulation of sea spray ice, atmospheric icing 
and snow on stationary objects. We should note that 
the recommendations of Norsok N-003 are as follows:  
− North of 70° north on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, a nominal value for thickness of the 
accumulated icing caused by precipitation may be 
selected as 20 mm. If the nominal values are 
applied, an ice density of 900 kg/m3 shall be used. 
This thickness can be assumed constant from a 
height of 5 m above sea level to the top of the 
facilities (Norsok N-003 paragraph 6.7.3).Note that 
atmospheric icing applies at all surfaces on a 
vessel, in particular on masts and pipes etc.  
− According to Norsok N-003 (Table A5), the 
expected snow accumulation per day represent 0.8 
– 1.0 kPa with an annual probability of exceedance 
of 10-2 over a horizontal area of 1m2.  
Using an approximate horizontal area of KV 
Nordkapp of 1500 m2, the weight of the accumulated 
snow using a value of e.g. 0.5 kPa, would be 750 kN 
(76tf), a substantial weight.  
Whether these values should be communicated to 
the maritime industry as design basis for ultimate 
stability checks in case of getting into a Polar low 
situation, should be debated.  
The STCW convention requests just an 
introduction of the theme “Ship icing” for ship 
officers according to the Polar Code, and the code 
only applies for larger ships operating in polar 
waters. This is challenging because all the highlighted 
shipwreck cases show that hardly none of these ships 
are regulated by this code.  
The loss of 6 fishing vessels west of the coast of 
Denmark in 1979 also shows the limitations of the 
code related to occurrence of ship icing outside polar 
waters. 
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of the present work was to set focus on 
ship icing, and may provide a guideline or a 
foundation for recommendations of measures for 
preventing or limiting ship icing. The analysis 
presented has revealed that the phenomenon of ship 
icing is one important cause of stability-related 
accidents due to the reduction of reserve buoyancy 
and stability. In this respect, the important objective 
for ship officers is to have competence to enable 
precautionary measures to avoid such situations. 
Focus on what MET schools should teach ship officer 
students related to ship icing aspects is therefore a 
direct consequence of the objective of this work.  
Sufficiently accurate icing rate prediction models 
have still to be developed and verified to obtain 
realistic icing forecasts. Some icing rate models seem 
to be accurate, but they may have to be customized to 
various types of ships. Prediction of Polar lows is still 
challenging, and this is probably the most challenging 
aspect because it is a perquisite for shipmasters to 
secure their sailing routes in advance to avoid icing 
conditions. The KV Nordkapp case shows that even 
larger ships can be affected by severe ship icing, 
challenging their stability limits in such conditions.  
Different technological de-icing solutions have 
been developed during the last decades. Some of 
these technologies have been developed for other 
industries and are later adapted and identified for 
marine use (Ryerson, 2011). Advanced ships have 
installed different types of these technologies to 
prevent ice to accumulate and for removing already 
accumulated ice like e.g. the Roll to Roll CNT Coating 
for Electro Thermal Heating (Rashid et al., 2018). Such 
equipment is expensive, both in procurement and in 
use, and it is not currently relevant for e.g. fishing 
vessels, which represent most of the losses due to ship 
icing.  
For fishing vessels, introducing operational 
measures to minimize ice accretion could be an 
option. In such cases, avoiding the sea spray impact 
by manoeuvring the ship for downwind heading 
leads to a reduction in wave impacts with consequent 
reduction in the amount of sea spray icing (Guest and 
Luke 2005).  
Based on the number of stability related accidents 
caused by ship icing, we would recommend that 
STCW should implement stricter standards for 
minimum required competence for all ship officers, 
related to ship icing. These standards should be 
mandatory in MET schools’ curriculums.  
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